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This paper studies the effect of reorganization costs on the efficiency of bankruptcy laws. We 
develop a simple model that predicts that in a regime with high costs, the law fails to achieve the 
efficient outcome of liquidating unviable businesses and reorganizing viable ones. We test the 
model using the Colombian bankruptcy reform of 1999. Using data from 1,924 firms filing for 
bankruptcy between 1996 and 2003, we find that the pre-reform reorganization proceeding was so 
inefficient that it failed to separate economically viable firms from inefficient ones. In contrast, 
by substantially lowering reorganization costs, the reform improved the selection of viable firms 
into reorganization. In this sense, the new law increased the efficiency of the bankruptcy system 
in Colombia.  
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Nearly ninety countries around the world have reformed their bankruptcy codes since 
World War II and over half of them have done so during the last decade. The extent to 
which these reforms will succeed depends on their design and the context in which the 
new codes are binding (Claessens, S., et al., 2001; Franks and Loranth, 2005; Hart, 2000 
and World Bank, 2004, 2005 and 2006). Yet, all countries seek to improve the efficiency 
of the bankruptcy system by encouraging the reorganization of viable firms and the 
liquidation of unviable ones. This requires a delicate balance (White, 1989). On the one 
hand, if the law is lenient towards failing firms, it will inevitably allow inefficient firms 
to continue operations. On the other, if the law favors liquidation, it will also liquidate 
viable firms.  
  Due to this trade-off, the design of bankruptcy laws is still a much debated topic 
(Claessens and Klapper, 2003; Smith and Strömberg, 2004 and references therein). The 
debate has focused on comparing two stylized bankruptcy proceedings: cash auctions or 
liquidations and structured bargainings or reorganizations. Critics of reorganizations 
argue that conflicting interests among claimholders and managers lead to excessively 
lengthy and costly negotiations (Baird, 1986; Aghion et al., 1992). Critics of liquidations 
claim that they contribute to the inefficient sale of assets due to market illiquidity and 
transaction costs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992; Aghion et al., 1992).
1 
  While there is a growing literature estimating the costs of bankruptcy (Bris et al. 
2005 for a review), there is little empirical evidence assessing how these costs affect the 
ability of laws to separate viable businesses from unviable ones, a key to ensuring 
efficiency. This paper attempts to fill this gap by using a bankruptcy reform that took 
place in Colombia.  
In the midst of financial crisis, facing a backlog of failing businesses entering a 
very inefficient bankruptcy process, Colombia adopted a new reorganization code in late 
1999. This law, known as Law 550, streamlined the reorganization process by 
                                           
1 Using data from Sweden, Stromberg (2000) show that liquidations also suffer from conflicts of interest 
among claimholders.   3
establishing shorter statutory deadlines for reorganization plans, reducing opportunities 
for appeal by debtors and requiring mandatory liquidation in cases of failed negotiations.  
We present a simple model that describes the decision to reorganize or liquidate a 
financially distressed firm as a function of reorganization costs. In a regime with high 
idiosyncratic reorganization costs, some viable businesses may be liquidated if the costs 
they face are too high. In this case, the bankruptcy system fails to separate viable from 
unviable firms, resulting in inefficient outcomes. In contrast, when reorganization costs 
are low, the model predicts that better quality firms are more likely to choose 
reorganization, resulting in a clear separation between firms that reorganize and those 
that liquidate. In this regime, as a result of both lower costs and better selection, the 
recovery after reorganization is significantly improved thus contributing to more efficient 
outcomes.  The Colombian reform can be seen as a natural experiment with two regimes 
that match our model – a pre-reform regime with high reorganization costs and the post-
reform regime with low costs. 
We use a unique dataset obtained from the Colombian Superintendence of 
Companies which includes a total of 1,924 bankruptcy cases, representing the universe of 
cases filed between 1996 and 2004, conveniently spanning the reform episode. We also 
use data of about 14,000 active companies that report to the same Superintendence over 
the same time period. One attractive feature of the dataset is that it predominantly 
consists of non-listed firms thus complementing the US literature, which has focused 
mainly on public firms.
2 The financial data we use come only from financial statements, 
and so we rely on accounting-based models (e.g. Z-score model of Altman 1968 and 
2000) to construct an indicator of financial distress. 
We show that the reform achieved a reduction in reorganization costs that made 
reorganization an attractive option for distressed but viable firms. First, we find that the 
duration of reorganization proceedings significantly decreases overall and also relative to 
the duration of liquidations with the new reorganization code. This finding supports our 
                                           
2 The literature on reorganization costs in the US mostly draws conclusions from the relatively small 
number of public corporations (see for example Altman, 1984; Weiss, 1990 and Weiss and Wruck, 1998). 
A notable exception is Bris et al. (2005), which use a sample of 286 public and private firms, the largest 
sample in the US, and Davydenko and Franks (2005) who use a large sample of small firms from France, 
Germany and the UK.    4
model’s assumption of lower (indirect) costs after the reform. Second, under the old law, 
we observe that firms filing for reorganization are indistinguishable from those filing for 
liquidation based on several measures of financial health. In contrast, relatively healthier 
(and hence more viable) firms are more likely to file for reorganization after the new law, 
producing a clear separation in the distribution of the two types of firms. Finally, we find 
that the level of recovery after the reorganization episode is significantly improved under 
the new law. While under the old law firms hovered at about the same low level of 
financial health for years after entering into reorganization, we observe a clear recovery 
under the new law. We conclude that the new law increased the efficiency of the 
bankruptcy system in Colombia.  
Previous bankruptcy studies analyze the existing laws of a given country or make 
comparisons across different countries. Evidence from the US Chapter 11 reorganizations 
offers mixed conclusions on the magnitude of these costs. While Altman (1984) and 
Hotchkiss (1995) among others find high Chapter 11 costs, Alderson and Betker (1995) 
and Maksimovic and Phillips (1998) find them to be low. More recently, Bris et al. 
(2005) show that reorganization costs are heterogeneous across firms but comparable to 
US Chapter 7 liquidations costs, although reorganizations as compared to liquidations 
preserve the assets better. In contrast, Thorburn (2000) finds that liquidations in Sweden, 
which have a statutory deadline, are faster and cheaper than reorganizations in the US. 
Bris et al. (2005), however, question the validity of  the comparison because the US and 
Sweden differ from each other in many other ways besides the bankruptcy codes.  
In this paper, we look at the impact of a statutory deadline in the reorganization 
proceeding but avoid country comparisons by studying a bankruptcy reform in a country. 
We exploit the fact that the reform only affects the reorganization proceeding, allowing 
us to compare firms that file for reorganization to firms filing for liquidation before and 
after the law. However, since the law was introduced because of a major financial crisis, 
we need to make sure that we can attribute the effects to the new law and not the 
changing macroeconomic conditions.
3 Similarly, a gradual improvement of the judiciary 
system could also confound the results. We address these concerns by controlling for 
                                           
3 See Uribe and Vargas (2002) or Urrutia and Zárate (2001) for details about the causes and magnitude of 
the crisis.   5
overall trends and making sure that the crisis did not affect differently reorganizations 
relative to liquidations. We find that the crisis had the same effect on both groups of 
firms, thus suggesting that our identification strategy is valid.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II develops the model and 
Section III outlines the main testable implications. Sections IV and V present and 
describe the data in detail. Section VI presents our empirical specifications, Sections VII 
and VIII discuss the main results and robustness tests and Section IX concludes. The 
background information on the bankruptcy system in Colombia and details of the new 
reorganization Law 550 of 1999 are presented in Appendix 1.  
 
II. Model 
In this section we develop a model in the spirit of White (1994) that focuses on 
the decision to reorganize or liquidate as a function of reorganization costs, which are 
specific to the firm (Bris et al., 2005). 
 
A. Assumptions 
At date0 , firm i obtains a loan to finance a project that yields an idiosyncratic 
return (cash-flow) of  1 i x  at date 1 and  2 i x  at date 2. The lender (bank) agrees to give the 
loan in exchange for repayments  p  at dates 1 and 2. The repayment schedule is the 
same for all firms.  
If the return from the project at date 1,    1 i x , is lower than  p  then firm i is in 
financial distress. We assume that at this point the bank gains control of the firm and 
decides whether to liquidate or reorganize the firm. If liquidation is chosen, the bank 
obtains  1 i x L + ,  p L <  where L is the scrap value of the firm's assets. If instead 
reorganization is chosen, the bank obtains current cash-flow  1 i x  and allows the firm to 
continue its operations until date 2 when a new payment  2 i p  will be made. At date 2, 
the value of the firm's assets is zero and the firm is shut down. Thus, liquidation values at 
each date are equal for all firms. 
Since managers obtain a payoff of zero if the firm is liquidated but may receive a 
positive payoff (net of bank repayment and reorganization costs) if the firm is   6
reorganized, they will always prefer reorganization to liquidation. The bank however 
must weight the immediate gain of liquidation against expected net gain of 
reorganization. 
Letting the firm's net return at date 2 be  ) ( ) ( 2 2 2 i i i i i x c x x n − = , repayment to the 
bank  2 i p  will be  p  if net return satisfies  p x n i i ≥ ) ( 2   but it will only equal net return 
) ( 2 i i x n  if  p x n i i < ) ( 2 . The cost of reorganization  ) (⋅ i c  may include fixed and variable 
costs which may depend on the idiosyncratic return  2 i x  itself. But more importantly, as 
shown in Bris et al. (2005) for the US and in our empirical results of Section VII.A, 
reorganization costs are specific to the firm. Thus, firms may face different expected 
reorganization costs at date 1 despite realizing the same returns at dates 1 and 2.
4 This is 
the reason why the cost function  ) (⋅ i c  is indexed by i. Without loss of generality, we 
assume that these costs are bounded above by  ) ( 2 i x c . Thus,  ) ( ) ( 0 2 2 i i i x c x c ≤ ≤ . The 
only other restriction we impose on these reorganization costs is that the net return 
function for firm i at date 2,   ) ( 2 i i x n , be strictly increasing in  2 i x .  
We assume that there are two types of firms in the economy: economically viable 
and unviable firms. A fraction θ  of economically viable firms obtain returns x from the 
probability density function  0 ), ( ≥ x x fH  while unviable (inefficient) firms draw  x from 
the distribution  0 ), ( ≥ x x fL . By definition, the density functions  H L j f j , ), ( = ⋅  are such 
that  [] [ ] L p E p H p E | | 2 2 > > , where  [ ] H L j j p E , , | 2 = can be written as 
 
[] [ ] ∫
−




2 2 2 2
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4 The difference in  reorganization costs may come from the specific nature of the firm’s assets or 
operations, or the bankruptcy process itself, which could carry a large idiosyncratic component, for 
example, the length of the process could depend on qualifications and experience of a judge or promoter 
assigned to the case.   7
In addition, we assume that  H L j f j , ), ( = ⋅  satisfy the strict monotone likelihood 
ratio property (MLRP).
5 With this assumption, the realized return  1 i x  provides 
information about the expected return  2 i x  that will be taken into account by the bank 
when deciding whether to liquidate or reorganize a distressed firm. In addition, since at 
date 0  the bank only knows the proportion of viable firms and loan size is equal for all 
firms, the repayment schedule is also the same for every firm.  
Assuming no discounting, the bank will reorganize firm iat date 1 if 
 
[] L x p E i i ≥ 1 2 | .                                                                            (2) 
 
Using Bayes Law and dropping subscript i, the expectation in the left hand side 
can be written as follows: 
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where  [] H L j j p E , , | 2 =  is given by Equation 1. 
 
B. Implications  
We now discuss the predictions of our model in the context of the Colombian 
reform. Since the main purpose of Law 550 was to shorten the statutory deadlines of 
reorganizations, we model it as a reduction in the maximum cost from  ) (⋅ B c  (before Law 
550) to  ) (⋅ A c  (after Law 550),  ) ( ) ( ⋅ > ⋅ A B c c . We interpret this cost as the time it takes to 
approve a reorganization plan. A potential indirect cost is the time that managers have to 
spend in meetings with creditors. Less time involved in actually running the firm may 
                                           
5 Let  x x > , then strict MLRP implies that  0 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( > − x f x f x f x f H L L H . See Milgrom (1981) for 
further details.   8
result in lower cash-flows. Likewise, a prime direct cost are lawyer’s fees, and so the 
shorter the proceeding, the lower the expenses should be. 
Figure 1 explains in a graph the decision that banks face at date 1 by plotting the 
payoffs to liquidation and reorganization in Equation 2 in the relevant range of observed 
cash-flow at date 1,  1 i x , when the firm is in distress,  p xi < 1 . The liquidation value is the 
same in both panels because only reorganization was affected by the change in the law. 










x x x x n E
x p E
ip i i i i
i i  
where  ip x  is defined as the observed cash-flow at date 1 that makes the net 
expected payoff to reorganization equal to  p .
6 Given the assumption of MLRP, expected 
net cash-flow  ) ( 2 i i x n  at date 2 is increasing in observed cash-flow at date 1,  1 i x . For a 
firm that expects reorganization costs to be zero, expected net cash-flow for a distressed 
firm equals that of an active firm and is simply the expected cash-flow  2 i x  itself. This is 
given by the top increasing line as  1 x  goes from 0   to  p x , and the horizontal line at  p  
for  p x x > 1 . Since cash-flows are not affected by the law, the payoff to reorganization for 
firms that expects zero costs is the same (as shown in the left and right panel of Figure 1). 
The key difference arises when expected reorganization costs are positive. The bottom 
increasing line from 0  to  p  plots expected net cash-flow  ) ( 2 i i x n  for a firm that expects 
the maximal reorganization costs. As described above, these expected costs are higher 
before the law (left panel) than after (right panel).  
 Because costs are specific to the firm, a firm in distress before the law with a 
relatively high cash-flow could be liquidated if the expected reorganization costs were 
high, while a firm with a low cash-flow could be reorganized if the expected 
                                           
6 More formally,  
ip x  is such that  p x x n E ip i i = ] | ) ( [ 2 . Notice that 
ip x could be higher, equal or lower than  p . 
Since reorganization costs only matter if the firm is in financial distress, that is, when cash-flows at date 1  
satisfy  p x
i ≤ ≤ 1 0 , if the threshold  ip x  is such that  p xip > , then   ip x  is irrelevant. This is the case in both 
panels of Figure 1 when expected reorganization costs are maximum. However, when expected 
reorganization costs are zero we have that  p xip <  and thus  ip x  is plotted in Figure 1.   9
reorganization costs were low. In other words, depending on the distribution of expected 
reorganization costs across firms, the distribution of cash-flows between firms that 
restructure and those that liquidate before the law could be the same. In this case, the law 
induces reorganization costs that are so high that prevent firms with relatively high cash-
flows (most likely economically viable firms) from reorganizing. 
After the law is introduced, however, reorganization costs decrease substantially. 
There is a threshold cash-flow at date 1, 
* x , such that if date 1 cash-flow satisfies 
*
1 x x > , then it is never optimal to liquidate even if the firm expect the maximum 
reorganization costs. Firms with 
*
1 x x <  may still be either liquidated or reorganized, 
depending on the expectation of  ) (⋅ i c . As a result, liquidated firms will tend to have 
lower cash-flows than reorganized firms.
7 After the reform, reorganization costs are 
lower, so banks prefer to always reorganize firms with relatively high cash-flows. In 
essence, the bankruptcy system is able to separate and rehabilitate firms that are expected 
to be viable from those that are not. 
 
C. Discussion 
The model just described is very stylized but does deliver the prediction that if 
costs are large enough, the bankruptcy law may fail to achieve one of its prime 
objectives: the screening of viable firms from unviable ones. Simplicity however comes 
at the cost of abstracting from potentially important issues. For example, it has only one 
creditor, like in Kahl (2002), so we do not model coordination frictions among creditors, 
as in Bulow and Shoven (1978), Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) or Strömberg (2000). We 
also abstract from ex-ante efficiency discussions, as we only focus on the decision to 
reorganize or restructure once the firm is in financial distress. 
                                           
7 Figure 1 is drawn assuming that the expected repayment to the bank when the firm does not expect 
reorganization costs (or expects net cash-flow 
2 x ) is higher than its liquidation value even if the firm 
obtained zero cash-flow at date 1 . If this assumption does not hold, then firms with very low cash-flow 
would always be liquidated, before and after the reform. It would still be the case that in the high cost 
regime (before Law 550), firms with relatively high cash-flows could still be liquidated if reorganization 
costs expected by the firm were large enough. 
   10
The model however can easily be extended to a setup similar to Kahl (2002) to 
explore another dimension of efficiency in bankruptcy laws. Kahl (2002) presents an 
interesting model where in the context of uncertainty about the firm's viability, a strategy 
of delayed liquidation where the firm is allowed to continue but is kept highly leveraged 
may be desirable, as it allows creditors to observe future firm performance and to make a 
better informed decision. In our model of heterogeneous and uncertain reorganization 
costs, banks could regret having reorganized firms that ex-post ended up with a large cost 
of reorganization. If at date 1 distressed firms were allowed to continue producing 
without incurring reorganization costs but actual reorganization cost were still realized at 
date  2 , then if banks were given another chance to choose between liquidation and 
continuation, they would in some cases revert their decisions and force firms to a 
mandatory liquidation. The likelihood of this event depends on how large the 
reorganization costs can be. Because reorganization costs are significantly lower after the 
reform, the number of reorganization cases that end up in mandatory liquidation should 
be lower. We test this prediction below. 
Finally, the model assumes that liquidation values and the distribution of cash-
flows remain unaffected by the introduction of the law. But because the law is introduced 
during a major crisis, one could make the argument following Shleifer and Vishny (1992) 
that adverse macroeconomic conditions may lower liquidation values (as well as the 
distribution of cash-flows). This is particularly important in the context of the model 
because the result of separation of viable and unviable firms obtained from a relative 
improvement of reorganization costs could also come from lower liquidation values.
8 We  
offer a test of this assumption below.  
 
III. Testable Assumptions and Implications 
This section describes the testable assumptions and implications of the model that 
follow from the introduction of the new law: (A) reduction in reorganization costs, (B) 
                                           
8 Changes in the distribution of cash-flows are analogous to changes in reorganization costs. A worsening 
of the distribution of cash-flows (as an increase in reorganization costs) will result in more liquidations and 
thus will work against the separation of viable from unviable firms.   11
selection of healthier firms into reorganization, and (C) faster recovery of reorganized 
firms.  
The results are driven by two different types of firms: those that would have filed 
for reorganization under both laws, and those that would not file under the old law (either 
because they filed for liquidation or were involved in out-of-court settlements) but now 
file under the new reorganization proceeding. We consider them together in the analysis 
of Section VI.  
 
A. Duration of Reorganization  
In light of our model, we interpret the effect of Law 550 as a decline in 
reorganization costs. One obvious component of the overall cost of reorganization is the 
time it takes to approve the reorganization plan (Franks and Torous, 1989 or more 
recently Bris et al., 2005). Since the new law limited the negotiations to a maximum of 
eight months, one would expect total costs (direct and indirect) to also decrease on 
average.  
Hypothesis A1. The duration of reorganization decreases after the new law is 
introduced (overall and relative to liquidations). 
The model assumes that liquidation values did not change. We can test this 
assumption by using indirect liquidation costs (measured by the duration of liquidations) 
as a proxy for liquidation value: 
9 
Hypothesis A2. The duration of liquidation remains constant, and thus liquidation 
values do not change. 
To test the validity of these hypotheses, we compare the length of reorganization 
and liquidation cases before and after the law.   
 
B. Selection into Reorganization 
The main implication from the model is that the reform contributed to the 
efficiency of the bankruptcy law by separating viable from non viable firms. Before the 
                                           
9 Liquidation values could also be driven by the fluctuations in the scrap value of the assets that are 
uncorrelated with the costs of liquidation as measured by the length of the process. We don’t have adequate 
data to test this assumption.     12
law, reorganization was so inefficient that it failed to separate viable from unviable firms. 
Here we test whether the new Law 550 improved the efficiency of the bankruptcy system 
by allowing viable firms to choose reorganization as a now attractive alternative.  
Hypothesis B1. Before the new law, liquidating firms are indistinguishable from 
reorganizing firms, while after the law, liquidating firms have weaker financial health, 
relative to reorganizing firms. 
Also as discussed in the previous section, the resulting efficiency of the 
reorganization procedure should result in a lower proportion of reorganization cases that 
end up in mandatory liquidation. 
Hypothesis B2. The number of reorganizations that result in mandatory 
liquidation is lower after the new law. 
 
C. Recovery after Reorganization  
As a direct result of both lower costs and better selection, the recovery of 
distressed firms after reorganization should improve significantly.  




The data used come from the Superintendence of Companies of Colombia. We 
use two different datasets, bankruptcy filings and financial statements. We now explain 
each one in more detail.   
 
A. Bankruptcy Data 
 These data include the universe of liquidations (L) and reorganizations (R) filed 
with the Superintendence from 1995 until 2004. R firms are divided into Concordato and 
Acuerdo, depending on the time of the filing. Before 2000 (under Law 222), the firm 
filed a Concordato, while after 2000 (under the Law 550), it filed an Acuerdo. 
All cases report the starting date but only about half report the ending date. Many 
of the ending dates are missing because the process is still ongoing, especially among   13
liquidations.
10 For firms that have a start and end of the filing, we construct a 
DURATION variable that measures the length of the proceeding in months.  
Since reorganization automatically ends in mandatory liquidation if negotiations 
break down, in many cases the same firm files first for reorganization and later for 
liquidation. In our analysis, we only use data of the firm’s initial filing. Thus, if the firm 
first applied for reorganization and then was forced to liquidate, we only use data from its 
reorganization. While this shortens our liquidation sample by about half of the total 
number of liquidations observed, this rule ensures that all firms enter liquidation directly, 
and not as a result of failed reorganizations.  
Table 1A reports the distribution of firms that entered bankruptcy proceedings 
under each of the three cases. We have a total of 1,924 initial filings. About a quarter of 
these firms file for liquidation directly and the rest of file for reorganization. About half 
of our sample filed under the old law.  
In addition to initial filings, Table 1A also reports the total number of mandatory 
liquidations in the second column. A total of 214 firms that originally filed a Concordato 
and 184 firms that filed an Acuerdo have later on filed for liquidation.
11 As discussed 
above, all these secondary filings are excluded from analysis. This allows us to focus on 
the initial filing decision, which we believe is the most affected by the legal reform. 
 
B. Financial Data  
In addition to firms that filed for liquidation or reorganization, we have data for 
all firms that periodically report to the Superintendence of Companies. By law, all firms 
with sales or assets exceeding 6,000 minimum wages in the fiscal year, foreign branches, 
commercial consortiums, livestock funds and special interest firms as declared by the 
president are required to provide financial statements once a year to the Superintendence. 
Our sample consists then of larger firms although virtually none is listed in the 
Colombian stock exchange. Table 1B reports the sector breakdown. The data cover the 
                                           
10 We found 13 Concordato cases with a recorded starting date after 2000. Since the new law was passed in 
December 1999, there should be no Concordato cases after 1999. We therefore drop these 13 cases from 
our sample.   
11 In addition, 50 firms that filed a Concordato under the old law, later filed an Acuerdo under the new law 
(not shown in Table 1A). Of these cases, 21 failed and moved to mandatory liquidation.   14
period 1996-2003 and contain about 14,000 firms with close to 70,000 firm-year 
observations. We refer to this as the sample of active firms.  
We merged our sample of bankrupt firms with the financial data sample using a 
firm unique identifier. Out of 1,924 bankrupt firms only 1,201 firms have financial data 
in at least one year, resulting in a total of about 5,400 firm-year observations. Our panel 
is rather unbalanced and for many firms we only have one or a few years of data 
available; some firms have only pre-filing data and some have only post-filing data. The 
last three columns of Table 1A give the distribution of these firms with financial data 
across three types of proceedings and initial time of the filing.  
For our bankrupt firms we create a timeline around the time of filing. We refer to 
the year of filing as year 0, the first year after filing as +1 and the year before filing as -1.  
To study the filing decision, we would like to use financial data at the time of 
filing (i.e. year 0). However, for some firms we have no data for the filing year, but have 
some data from previous years.
12 To increase our sample size we use all firms that have 
data for either year 0, -1 or -2. In total, we have 1,032 bankrupt firms with pre-filing 
financial data. We refer to this as the bankrupt sample.   
In addition to the filing decision, we are interested in comparing the speed of 
recovery after filing for reorganization before and after the new law. To do this we 
require pre and post filing data. To ensure that observed changes in performance are not 
caused by changes in sample composition, we construct a sample of firms with available 
financial data for the filing year and at least one year pre and post filing. Due to this 
stricter data requirement, we have only around 300 firms with about 2,000 firm-year 
observations. We refer to this as our time-series sample.  
 
C. Matched Sample of Active Firms 
Our filing data include years with different macroeconomic conditions, including 
an episode of major financial crisis in 1999. To control for differences in macroeconomic 
conditions affecting our bankrupt firms, we create a matched sample of active firms. For 
                                           
12 For example, we have 794 firms with data for the filing year. In addition, we have 166 firms with 
financial data for year -1 (but no data for the filing year) and additional 73 firms have data for year -2 (but 
no data for year 0 or -1).   15
each firm in our bankrupt sample we pick one active firm that matches the bankrupt firm 
by size, year and industry. First, we pick all active firms in the same industry and same 
year as the bankrupt firm.
13 Then, for each bankrupt firm we find an active firm (among 
all active firms available in the same year and industry) that is closest in absolute distance 
to the size of the bankrupt firm, based on total assets. We make sure that the same active 
firm is not assigned to two different bankrupt firms in different years. We end up with 
1,032 matched (M) firms (one for each firm in our bankrupt sample), referred to as the 
matching sample.  
 
D. Variables 
We focus on several financial characteristics of the firm. On the liability side, we 
calculate the following indebtedness ratios: total liabilities, trade credit and total debt, all 
scaled by total assets (we refer to these ratios as TL_TA, TRADE_TA and DEBT_TA, 
respectively). We also look at two performance ratios: ROA – return on assets, calculated 
as income before taxes over total assets and RE_TA - the ratio of retained earnings over 
assets. The former reports the performance of the firm in the year prior to the filing and 
the latter reflects cumulative performance over time, i.e. firms that continually have been 
making losses will have low (or even negative) retained earnings.  
Our main firm characteristic is the Z-score index constructed by Altman (1968) 
and updated by Altman (2000). It combines indebtedness, performance and liquidity 
measures and is commonly used as an indicator of financial distress.
14 Based on Altman 
(2000) model estimated for non-publicly listed firms, the Z-score is given by: 
 
 Z-score=0.717*WC_TA + 0.847*RE_TA+ 3.107*ROA+ 0.420*BVE_TL+0.998*S_TA 
 
                                           
13 Thus, if a bankrupt firm has data for year 0, we use that year to find a match, but if it has financial data 
for year -1 or -2, we use that year to find a match. 
14 Although recent research has challenged the use of accounting-based models such as Altman’s in favor 
of Black-Scholes-Merton default probability models (Hillgeist et al., 2004), these models require stock 
market data. Unfortunately, most of the firms in our sample are non-listed firms. But even if we had stock 
market data, it remains to be settled whether the stock market in Colombia is efficient, as BSM default 
probability models assume. In any event, rather than using the Z-score to predict actual default, we use it a 
measure of firm financial health in order to assess the impact of the law.   16
where, WC_TA is working capital (defined as current assets minus current liabilities over 
total assets), which is a measure of liquidity, ROA and RE_TA are describe above, 
BVE_TL is the ratio of book value of equity over total liabilities (a measure of 
indebtedness similar to the ratio of total liabilities to total assets) and S_TA is a ratio of 
total sales over total assets, which is used as another performance measure. We report the 
results for the composite Z-score, as it presents the overall measure of financial health. In 
most cases, since the sub-components of the Z-score behave similarly to the overall 
measure, the results are not reported (but are available on request).  Finally, we use firm 
size (calculated as log of total assets) and firm age as controls.  
To eliminate influential observations, we clean the data and remove outliers on all 
ratios. For ratios that are bounded from below by zero we only remove 1% of outliers on 
the top. For unbounded ratios we remove 1% on the top and the bottom of the 
distribution.
15 For Z-score we remove outliers for each individual component before 
constructing the Z-score.  
Table 1C reports basic summary statistics for our two samples of bankrupt firms 
and matched firms. As Table 1C shows, there is no difference in size and age between 
bankrupt and matched active firms.  
 
V. Descriptive Analysis  
 
In this section we present graphical evidence and univariate mean tests. Figure 2 
plots kernel density distributions of the Z-score for R (reorganizations), L (liquidations) 
and M (matched active firms) before and after the change in the law. The vertical lines 
indicate the mean of each distribution.
16 As Figure 2 shows, before the new law was 
introduced, R and L firms have very similar density distributions of Z-scores. Thus, firms 
filing for reorganization were not significantly different from the firms filing for 
liquidation. However, after the new law was introduced, the differences in the 
                                           
15 The exception is the return on assets, for which we remove 2% on the top and bottom ends because this 
variable has very long tails. In addition, for our time-series tests we remove outliers before and after 
constructing the matched sample.  
16 Although the model derives testable implications from the firm returns, we use the Z-score index as both 
are related. Return on assets (ROA) is a component of the overall Z-score index.   17
distributions of R and L firms become more pronounced. Firms that liquidate are now 
clearly weaker relative to firms that reorganize. The whole distribution of L-firms shifted 
to the left with the new reorganization proceeding. In addition, the sample of matched 
active firms seems better off as its kernel density distribution has moved slightly to the 
right as compared to before the law.  This presents the first evidence in support of   
Hypothesis B1.  
We further examine the data using univariate mean tests of the variables described 
in Section IV.D. We first make pair-wise comparisons before and after the law 
(comparing R to L firms, R to M firms and L to M firms) and later we make before and 
after comparisons for each firm category. Tables 2A and 2B present the results.   
Several patterns seem to emerge from the data. Not surprisingly, columns 5 and 6 
of Table 2A show that R and L firms are significantly different from M firms: they have 
higher levels of debt (including bank debt and trade credit debt) and lower performance. 
Their overall financial health, measured by Z-score, is significantly weaker. In fact, 
active firms have on average positive Z-scores, while bankrupt firms have negative Z-
scores.  
The most interesting result comes from the comparison between R and L before 
and after the law. In column 4 of Table 2A we see that R firms are not significantly 
different from L firms before the law based on all six characteristics reported. However, 
from column 10 we see that R firms are significantly different from L firms after the law 
in five out of six characteristics. R firms have lower levels of total liabilities and trade 
credit obligations (and lower, but not statistically different levels of bank debt), better 
operating performance and higher overall Z-scores. These results confirm the graphical 
evidence of Figure 1 and provide additional evidence in support of Hypothesis B1.   
Table 2B presents a different cut of the data.
17 We again find that L firms are 
significantly worse after the law, having more debt and lower performance on all 
measures.  
Finally, the duration of both liquidations and reorganizations is shorter after the 
new law. The difference is much more pronounced for reorganizations, from an average 
                                           
17 Although the means presented in this table are the same as those reported in Tables 2A, we compare here 
firms in the same category (R, L and M) before and after the law.   18
of 34 months before the law to 12 months after. The difference for liquidations is more 
modest, with a change from 49 to 33 months. Recall however that duration can only be 
computed if both start and end dates are available. Since liquidations are usually long, our 
sample of finished liquidations is biased towards relatively short liquidations, especially 
after the law was introduced. We explore these differences more rigorously in Section 
VII.A.   
 
VI. Regression Models   
 
In this section we present the econometric models used to test formally the 
assumptions and implications of the model described in Section III. All models compare 
reorganizations to liquidations before and after the law. In some specifications we include 
the sample of active firms.  
 
A. Duration of Reorganization  
We are interested in comparing the length of reorganization and liquidation cases 
before and after the law.  The model we use is given by:  
 
 Durationi = β1Afteri  + β2Ri+ β3Afteri* Ri  + Xi’γ + ei,                        (2) 
 
where After is a dummy equal to one if the filing date occurred after the new law, 
R is a dummy for firms filing for reorganization and vector X contains control variables 
like firm age and size.  
Since half of the cases lack the end date, we assume that these cases are still 
unfinished.
18 To properly account for these unfinished cases, we estimate a Cox 
proportional hazard model. Coefficients in the hazard model of Equation (2) that are 
larger than one and significant are to be interpreted as increasing the probability that 
cases will end. Therefore, variables associated with positive and significant coefficients 
will contribute to shorter durations. The coefficient β1 shows the effect of the new law on 
                                           
18 The latest closing date in our data is August 3, 2004.   19
the length of liquidations and therefore tests Hypothesis A2. It should be insignificant. 
Coefficient β2 picks up the average difference in the duration between reorganization and 
liquidations before the law. Finally, β3 picks up the length of reorganization as compared 
to liquidations after the law, and if Hypothesis A1 is correct, it should be positive and 
significant.    
 
B. Selection into Reorganization 
We estimate the following model combining the sample of bankrupt firms with 
the matched sample of active firms: 
 
Yi = β1Afteri + β2Bi+ β3Afteri* Bi + β4Bi*Ri + β5Afteri*Bi*Ri + Xi’γ +ei             (3)  
 
Here Y is one of the 6 dependent variables described in the previous section. In 
addition, B is a dummy for bankrupt firms (i.e. this dummy is equal to one for either R or 
L firms). We estimate these models by OLS, with heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White) 
standard errors.
19  
In this specification, β1 shows the effect of the new law on active companies, β2 
shows the difference between bankrupt and active firms before the new law, β3 shows the 
difference between bankrupt and active firms after the new law, β4 shows the difference 
between R and L before the new law and β5 shows the same difference after the new law. 




C. Recovery after Reorganization  
Finally, we want to test whether the new law contributed to a faster recovery of 
reorganized firms. Naturally, we do not have any post filing data for liquidation cases. 
                                           
19 Note that B*R dummy is the same as R (in that R firms are included in B category), but we present it in 
the form of interaction to highlight that in this model we not only compare firms that reorganize (R) to 
those liquidate (L) among bankrupt firms but we also compare bankrupt firms to active firms. 
20 We also run two simpler models: the first compares bankrupt firms with active firms, i.e. in effect 
restricting the model to β1, β2 and β3. The second model compares R to L firms, limiting the sample to 
include only bankrupt firms and thus only estimating β1, β4 and β5. The results are similar and not shown 
but available upon request.     20
Presumably these firms closed down or at least ceased to produce financial statements. 
Thus, this analysis is done only using reorganization cases. As already mentioned in 
Section IV.B, the sample for this analysis is smaller because of limited pre and post-law 
data availability. 
  Again, we focus on the Z-score as our main indicator. We expect to obtain 
something similar to a V-shape: a declining pattern before the filing as financial health 
deteriorates, and an increasing pattern (i.e. recovery) after the filing. We are interested to 
see whether this shape is affected by the law reform. Thus, we are interested in the slopes 
of time-trend variables. We define two time-trend variables: pre-filing period (Pretrend) 
and post-filing period (Posttrend). The Pretrend variable takes values -1, -2, -3 for years 
before the filing (and zero otherwise) and Posttrend variable takes value 1 in the year of 
filing, value of 2 in the first year after the filing and so on.
21  
Since the law was passed in 1999, the worst year of the crisis, firms filing after 
the law face an expansionary period while those that filed before the law faced the 
contraction. Thus, the effect of the overall macroeconomic conditions could be 
confounded with the effect of the new law that we are trying to capture. To remedy this 
problem, we assume that both bankrupt and active firms are equally affected by the 
macroeconomic conditions (an assumption that we are able to test in the next section). 
Our dependent variables are therefore defined as the difference in Yit between bankrupt 
and matched active firm. The model is given by 
 
DiffYit = β1Afteri + β2Pretrendit+ β3Postrendit+ β4Afteri* Pretrendit +              (4)      
β5Afteri*Postrendit+Xi’γ +eit.  
 
In this model, β2 shows the slope of DiffYit for years preceding the filing for firms 
that filed before the law. Analogously, β3 shows the slope of DiffYit for the years after the 
filing again for firms that filed before the law. We expect β2  to be negative (i.e. Z-scores 
decreasing over time) and β3 to be positive if the firms recovers after the reorganization. 
The interaction of trends with the After dummy will show differences in pre and post 
                                           
21 We also experimented with defining post-trend starting in the year after the filing (instead of the year of 
the filing) and including separate dummies for the filing year and we obtained similar results.   21
trend slopes for firms filing after the new law relatively to the slopes on these trends for 
firms filing under the old system.  
 
VII. Regression Results 
 
A. Duration of Reorganization  
Table 3 reports the hazard ratios from the Cox proportional hazard model in 
specification (2). In Column 1 the whole sample of firms for which we have duration data 
is used. Column 2 reports the same regression as Column 1 estimated on the sample of 
firms with financial data. The rest of columns include additional controls.
22  
We find that the AFTER coefficient is not significant in any specification. This 
implies that there are no differences in the length of liquidations before and after the law 
as Hypothesis A2 suggests. Second, reorganization proceedings seem to have shorter 
duration, especially after the reform. Before the reform, the marginal probability to finish 
the reorganization process (at any point in time) is 3 times that of the probability to finish 
liquidation. However, after the new law, this difference jumps to 14-25 times (depending 
on the specification). These results provide strong evidence that the law reform was very 
effective in shortening the length of reorganization, as Hypothesis A1 suggests. 
The last specification explores the relationship between duration and Z-score at 
the time of filing. We find that while the length of liquidation does not depend on initial 
Z-score, healthier firms have shorter reorganizations. This effect is stronger (about twice 
as much) after the law. In terms of the equations depicted in Figure 1, this finding 
suggests that the expected net cash-flows for the firm that expects the maximum 
reorganization costs (bottom increasing line as  1 x  goes from 0 to p) has higher slope than 
expected cash-flow from 0 to p (upper increasing line as  1 x  goes from 0 to p). Before the 
law this effect is smaller than after the law. 
 
B. Selection into Reorganization 
                                           
22 The number of observations is 1,896. The total number of bankrupt firms is 1,924 as shown in Table 1A. 
A total of 28 observations are dropped either because the start date is missing or the end date comes before 
the start date.   22
Table 4 reports our baseline results of the specification given in (3) which 
analyzes the financial conditions of firms at the time of filing. We focus our discussion 
on the Z-score results reported in Column 6. Bankrupt firms have significantly lower Z-
scores relative to active firms as the coefficient on the B dummy is negative and very 
significant, with a t-statistic of 9.7. This difference between bankrupt and active firms is 
even more pronounced after the new law as evidenced by the coefficient on After*B that 
is negative and significant. At the same time, the After coefficient suggests that active 
firms appear in better shape after the new law.  
The coefficients of interest are the interactions B*R and After*B*R. The first one 
is not significant, suggesting that under the old law there was no significant difference 
between firms filing for reorganization (i.e. R firms) and the firms filing for liquidation 
(i.e. L firms). However, the triple interaction is positive and significant at 1%, suggesting 
that under the new law there is significant difference between L and R firms and that R 
firms have higher Z-scores relative to L firms. In other words, after the new law R firms 
are significantly healthier relative to L firms. These results confirm those obtained in the 
graphical analysis and mean tests and support our Hypothesis B1.   
We observe similar patterns in other dependent variables, although significance is 
somewhat weaker than the overall Z-score measure. The coefficient on the triple 
interaction is significant for ROA, RE_TA, and for LIA_TA (at 11%). These results 
provide strong evidence for the effectiveness of the new law in separating healthier firms 
for reorganization.   
We also compare the number of reorganizations that result in mandatory   
liquidations before and after the new law. Table 1A shows that about 40 percent of firms 
filing for reorganization under the old law ended up in liquidation, while only about 26 
percent did so under the new law. This difference is statistically significant with a t-
statistic of close to 6. This result, validating Hypothesis B2, is further evidence that Law 
550 contributed to the efficiency of the Colombian bankruptcy system. 
  
C. Recovery after Reorganization  
Finally, we study the time-series patterns in the Z-score for reorganizing firms. 
Note that our sample for this test contains firms with at least one pre-filing data point and   23
at least one post-filing data point. Table 5A reports the average Z-scores for firms filing 
before and after the law and Figure 3 plots these means on a graph. We observe a clear 
pattern of declining Z-scores before filing, as expected. The financial health deteriorates 
as firms get closer to the verge of insolvency. This declining pre-filing pattern is 
observed for firms filing before and after the law. However, the recovery patterns are 
quite different in the two regimes. Before the law, no clear recovery is observed. Firms 
that filed for reorganization, if anything, are getting worse. In contrast, the recovery is 
very pronounced after the introduction of Law 550, with a clear upward trend in the years 
following the filing.  
Table 5B presents the regression analysis corresponding to the graphical evidence 
just described. As expected, the Pretrend coefficient is negative for performance 
measures (ROA and RE_TA) and positive for leverage measures, suggesting that before 
the filing, leverage is increasing while performance is deteriorating. There is no 
significant difference in pre-trend patterns before and after the law. However, there is a 
significant difference in the Posttrend after the new law – the coefficient is positive and 
significant for the Z-score (but insignificant for individual measures). We consider the Z-
score results to be the most important as this measure represents the overall index of 
financial health. These results suggest that after the new law, the reorganization process 
results in a more pronounced recovery in the years following the filing. This is in stark 
contrast to the post-filing pattern under the old law, which showed a continuous 
deterioration in firm performance. This evidence validates our Hypothesis C. 
 
VIII. Robustness to Crisis and Trend  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the new law was introduced in the midst of a 
major financial crisis in late 1999. For our identification strategy to work, we need to 
make sure that the crisis did not have a differential effect on R relative to L firms. 
Otherwise, the effects we observe after the introduction of the law could also be due to 
the crisis itself. We test this by creating two crisis windows: year 1999 (the worst year of 
the crisis) and years 1998-2000, which span the worst crisis year. Fortunately, since our 
sample covers 1996-2003, we have several years outside of the crisis window on both   24
sides (before and after the law), which allows us to test whether our results are influenced 
by the crisis.  
Another potential concern with our results is that the effect that we attribute to the 
law reform could actually come from a gradual improvement in the efficiency of the 
bankruptcy system over time. To test that we create a linear time trend and use it in 
interactions in the same fashion as our After variable.   
The crisis and trend regressions are presented in Table 6A for our duration results 
and Table 6B for Z-score.  
In both tables, the first column reproduces the baseline specification for 
comparison: in Table 6A it is model 1 from Table 3 and in Table 6B it is model 7 from 
Table 4. Model 2 adds the trend and its interactions, Model 3 adds Crisis99 and its 
interactions, Model 4 adds Crisis98_00, Model 5 adds Crissis99 and trend and Model 6 
adds Crisis98_00 and trend.  
Our main interactions with After*R (Table 6A) and After*B and After*B*R (in 
Table 6B) remain significant in all the specifications, suggesting that the difference 
between the pre-reform and post-reform periods is not related to the financial crisis.  
In Table 6B we see that Crisis99 dummy is significant and negative, suggesting 
that all firms were worse off during 1999, but Crisis98_00 is not significant, so the worst 
of the crisis is limited to 1999. Neither Crisis*B, nor Crisis*B*R interactions are 
significant, suggesting that crisis did not have any differential effect on bankrupt firms 
(relative to active) or R firms relative to L firms. Since Crisis has the same effect on the 
whole distribution of firms, our identification strategy, that is, comparing bankrupt to 
active and R to L, is valid.  
It is important to reiterate that the results presented Section VII.C on recovery 
after reorganization are not confounded by the crisis because the dependent variables are 
defined as the difference between the bankrupt firms and the matched sample of active 
firms. From the results reported above we know that crisis did not have any differential 
effects on Z-scores of bankrupt relative to active firms. Thus, the difference in recovery is 
a result of the law because the crisis effect is differenced out.  
 
IX. Conclusions   25
This paper studies the relevance of reorganization costs for the efficiency of 
bankruptcy laws. We develop a simple model that predicts that in a regime with high 
costs, the law fails to achieve the efficient outcome of liquidating unviable businesses and 
reorganizing viable ones.  
We test the model using Colombia as an example. In 1999, amidst a major crisis, 
the Colombian Congress replaced the existing corporate reorganization proceeding with a 
more streamlined procedure that limited negotiations to a maximum of eight months and 
stipulated that failure to reach an agreement would result in mandatory liquidation.  
We use data from all filing firms in Colombia between 1996 and 2003, spanning 
the change in the reorganization law, to provide evidence that the new law increased the 
efficiency of the bankruptcy system in Colombia. We first show that indirect 
reorganization costs, as measured by the duration of the reorganization process, have 
significantly decreased after the reform. Second, we show that the pre-reform 
reorganization proceeding was so inefficient that it failed to separate economically viable 
firms from inefficient ones. In contrast, by substantially lowering reorganization costs, 
the new law succeeds in selecting healthier (and hence more viable) firms for 
reorganization. Finally, we show that the recovery of reorganized firms is significantly 
improved after the reform, as a result of lower costs and better selection of viable firms.  
From a policy standpoint, this paper highlights the relevance of the design of 
bankruptcy laws. A reduction in the costs (both direct and indirect) associated with filing 
can contribute to the overall efficiency of the economy and should be a priority in the 
agenda for economic reforms.     26
Appendix 1. Background on Colombian Bankruptcy Law Reform.
23  
 
In 1995, the Law 222 was enacted in an attempt to reduce the judiciary burden by 
allowing disputes among creditors and debtors to be resolved under the Superintendence 
of Companies. In addition, the superintendence, under the Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce, is in charge of supervising firms to prevent insolvency and fraud. The law 
established the procedures for both mandatory liquidation and restructuring under the 
Concordato proceedings.  Voluntary liquidation was and is still regulated by the 
Commercial Code.  
Before Law 222, mandatory liquidations were civil bankruptcy proceedings that 
lasted for many years because civil courts lacked capacity and specific business 
knowledge. Under Law 222, however, mandatory liquidation proceedings are still 
lengthy, usually taking more than three years to resolve. The length of the proceedings in 
practice implies that a substantial part of the assets of the debtor are lost either because 
they loose value over time (indirect cost) or are spent towards paying the fees and 
expenses of the liquidation (direct costs). As a result, the perception is that mandatory 
liquidation is very inefficient.   
Although more authority was given to the superintendence, the Concordato 
proceedings under Law 222 still suffered from being excessively long. In essence, too 
much leverage was given to the debtor in the negotiations with creditors. Delays were 
favorable to debtors as they allowed them to suspend the debt service, and also granted 
protection by the stay against execution actions commenced by creditors 
 (Tamayo et al., 
2002).    
This situation resulted in many private agreements (workouts), mainly between 
the financial institutions and the debtor, outside the scope of the Concordato. These 
agreements were typically used to restructure and reschedule the debtor’s obligations but 
are considered onerous by both parties as it is difficult to reach agreements. In Colombia, 
they are regulated by the general Civil Law under the principle of freedom of will of all 
the parties involved.  
                                           
23 This Section draws from Urrutia (2004).   27
Starting in 1998 after decades of consistent growth, the Colombian economy 
suffered a major recession. The severity of the crisis forced the government to propose 
several bills to Congress. One of them replaced the sections of Law 222 that concerned 
the reorganization proceeding and became known as Law 550 after it was approved by 
Congress in December of 1999.  
The Law 550 applies to all types of companies, regardless of their organizational 
nature, except for financial institutions.  The entity responsible for conducting the 
proceedings is the Superintendence of Companies
24 as was the case under Law 222, or 
the relevant superintendence in charge of its supervision. 
The Acuerdo, or reorganization proceeding under Law 550, is divided into two 
major phases during which the management of the bankrupt firm remains in charge. The 
first consists of the determination of votes and claims according to the parties’ stake in 
the firm. In the second, the negotiation and voting of the reorganization plan takes place. 
Each phase may last for a maximum of 4 months and failure to meet the deadline results 
in mandatory liquidation.  
After a reorganization case was filed under old Law 222, the superintendence 
appointed a controller and a provisional committee of creditors. Past experience showed 
that the creditors committee and the controller interfered many times with the task of 
managing the company. Therefore, Law 550 eliminates the need to appoint a creditors 
committee and the controller for the proceedings. Instead, the Law 550 creates the figure 
of the promoter, an independent person also appointed by the relevant superintendence.
25 
The promoter gathers and analyzes business and financial information of the debtor, 
compiles a complete list of creditors, facilitates the negotiations among the creditors, 
conceives the restructuring plan and coordinates the voting process for approval of the 
restructuring agreement. The promoter participates actively in the negotiations and 
determines the voting rights among the parties involved. For his or her services, the 
                                           
24 Although the proceedings are administrative rather than judicial, Law 550 grants to the  superintendence 
the power and authority to make certain decisions which have the force of a final judgment.     
25 Sometimes, creditors and debtor may suggest a candidate for consideration, and practice has shown that 
when this happens, the Superintendent accepts the candidate suggested.   28
promoter is paid a success fee, thus having a stake in ensuring that an agreement will be 
reached.     
Under Law 222, any Concordato agreement had to be approved by the debtor. In 
practice, this implied that the debtor effectively had the veto power, regardless of his or 
her stake in the firm. To solve this problem, Law 550 establishes that shareholders of the 
debtor company are “internal creditors”, one of the five different classes
26 of creditors 
among which voting rights are distributed according to their claims to the firm.  
The number of votes needed to approve a reorganization plan also changed. 
Under Law 222, the Concordato required a majority vote of 75 percent of all creditors 
recognized in the proceedings, which many times became an insurmountable obstacle due 
to lack of interest of certain creditors which simply neglected to participate in the 
proceedings. In contrast, under Law 550 the Acuerdo only requires a 51 percent majority 
of the eligible votes of creditors to approve the restructuring agreement.  
Although Law 550 is an important improvement with respect to the previous law, 
a report commissioned by the superintendence shows some dissatisfaction among firms 
that filed for reorganization with regards to access to fresh credit. It thus seems that banks 
are still reluctant to give credit to firms under reorganization.  
In addition, several practitioners in Colombia have pointed out some 
improvements that if introduced could result in lower coordination costs among creditors 
and debtors and therefore lead to faster agreements.  Currently under Law 550, once the 
reorganization plan is approved with the required majority of creditors, it is binding by all 
parties. Dissenting creditors may file lawsuits before the relevant superintendence but this 
is problematic as small creditors may object to the plan delaying its implementation 
although their claim is relatively small.  
Law 550 was to be in force only for a five year term. The government and 
Congress approved a bill that will extend the application of Law 550 until December 
2006, while Congress discusses the new insolvency draft law.  
                                           
26 Claims are classified by the law both for purposes of voting and priority of claims. There are five 
different classes of creditors: Internal creditors, External creditors, Employees and retired employees, 
Governmental entities, Financial institutions. For purposes of priority the classification is that of the Civil 
Code.    29
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Table 1. Data availability  
 
The first four columns report the number of firms with existing bankruptcy data. The last three columns report the number of firms 
with existing bankruptcy and financial data and in parenthesis the total number of years of data for these firms. The first and fifth 
column report the total number of observations, the third and sixth the number of firms that filed before 2000, under the old law, and 
the fourth and seventh the number of firms that filed after 2000 under the new law. The second column reports the number of 
reorganizations that ended in mandatory liquidation. 
 
 









Number of firms 
 
Financial Data 
Number of firms 
(Number of firm - year obs.) 
Cases Description  Total  Mandatory 
Liquidation Before   After  Total  Before   After  


















TOTAL BANKRUPT FIRMS  Firms that filed for bankruptcy  
      
1,924 
 
      
398 
 







TOTAL ACTIVE FIRMS 
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Panel B. Number of Observations by Sector 
 
Bankrupt Active    
Main Sectors 
No. of firms  Percent  No. of  firms  Percent 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and 
fishing  83 6.9% 1,049 7.6%
Mining and quarrying  19 1.6% 406 2.9%
Manufacturing 478 39.8% 2,746 19.8%
Construction 147 12.2% 1,742 12.5%
Wholesale and retail trade  281 23.4% 3,137 22.6%
Hotels and restaurants  40 3.3% 192 1.4%
Transport, storage and 
communications  36 3.0% 777 5.6%
Financial intermediation  11 0.9% 1,399 10.1%
Real estate, renting and business 
activities  62 5.2% 2,011 14.5%
 Other  44 3.7% 431 3.1%
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Panel C. Summary statistics 
 
LIA_A is measured as total liabilities / total assets, TRADE_A is trade credits / assets, DEBT_A is total debts / total assets, ROA 
(return on assets) is income before taxes over assets, RE_TA is retained earnings / total assets. Z-score is calculated using Altman’s 
Z-score model: Z-score=0.717*WC_TA + 0.847*RE_TA + 3.107*ROA1 + 0.420*BVE_TL +0.998*S_TA. In this model, WC_TA is 
working capital / total assets, BVE_TL is book value of equity / book value of total liabilities, and S_TA is sales / total assets. 
DURATION is the length of the bankruptcy procedure computed from the starting and ending dates, measured in months. SIZE is log 
of total assets and AGE is log of year of incorporation. Column starting with p reports the percentile.  
Bankrupt Firms 
Variable  N.  Obs  Mean  St.  Dev Min  p5 p25 p50 p75 p95  Max 
LIA_A  1015 0.94 0.54 0.03 0.36 0.63 0.83 1.08 2.01 3.83 
TRADE_A  1014 0.39 0.34 0.00 0.05 0.17 0.30 0.50 1.04 2.49 
DEBT_A  1014 0.34 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.30 0.48 0.82 1.44 
ROA  999 -0.25  0.27 -1.32 -0.85 -0.35 -0.16 -0.06  0.01  0.19 
RE_TA  1002 -0.48  0.58 -3.59 -1.78 -0.62 -0.32 -0.11  0.03  0.26 
Z-score  1018 -0.61  2.19  -12.98 -4.29 -1.33  -0.24 0.51 1.70  15.68 
WC_TA  1011 -0.22  0.49 -2.57 -1.16 -0.43  -0.12 0.07 0.39 0.87 
RE_TA  1002 -0.48  0.58 -3.59 -1.78 -0.62 -0.32 -0.11  0.03  0.26 
BVE_TL  993 0.40 0.87  -0.66  -0.45  -0.05 0.22 0.60 1.74 9.26 
S_TA  1031 0.71 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.52 0.95 2.11 5.83 
SIZE  1022  14.84 1.42 8.69  12.68  13.93 14.80 15.80 17.14 18.79 
AGE  1008 2.65 0.79 0.00 1.10 2.20 2.77 3.22 3.76 4.04 
DURATION  740  19.38  15.55 0.00 6.20 8.05 12.70 26.65 53.95 74.70 
Matched sample of Active Firms 
Variable  N.  Obs  Mean  St.  Dev Min  p5 p25 p50 p75 p95  Max 
LIA_A  1029 0.49 0.32 0.00 0.06 0.27 0.48 0.68 0.95 4.46 
TRADE_A  1030 0.26 0.25 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.20 0.36 0.73 2.25 
DEBT_A  1030 0.13 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.19 0.44 0.98 
ROA  985 0.00 0.14  -1.16  -0.23  -0.04 0.02 0.07 0.17 0.26 
RE_TA  982 -0.08  0.40 -3.72 -0.65 -0.08 0.02 0.08 0.20 0.27 
Z-score  1005 2.41 2.66  -9.56  -0.51 1.07 2.05 3.26 7.64  16.55 
WC_TA  1013 0.19 0.31  -1.54  -0.29 0.01 0.18 0.38 0.68 0.92 
RE_TA  982 -0.08  0.40 -3.72 -0.65 -0.08 0.02 0.08 0.20 0.27 
BVE_TL  990 2.20 3.21  -0.59 0.04 0.47 1.04 2.35 9.63  20.31 
S_TA  1013 1.06 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.86 1.50 3.02 5.95 
SIZE  1022  14.84 1.41 8.56  12.70  13.94 14.80 15.79 17.13 18.78 
AGE  1003 2.62 0.81 0.00 1.10 2.20 2.77 3.22 3.69 4.04   34
Table 2. Mean tests 
 
R firms are those that filed for reorganization, L firms filed for liquidation, and M is the matched sample of active firms.  We mark 




Panel A. Pair wise comparison of R, L, and M firms before and after the law 
 
  Before the Law  After the Law 
Variables  R   L   M  R vs L   R vs M  L vs M  R   L  M  R vs L   R vs M  L vs M 
LIA_A  0.9 0.92  0.5  -0.02  0.40***  0.42*** 0.96 1.27 0.48     -0.31***  0.48***  0.79*** 
TRADE_A  0.36 0.35 0.26  0.01  0.10*** 0.09***  0.42  0.51  0.26    -0.09*  0.16***  0.25*** 
DEBT_A  0.38 0.36 0.14  0.02  0.24*** 0.22***  0.3  0.33  0.11    -0.03  0.19***  0.22*** 
ROA1  -0.27 -0.23 -0.01  -0.04  -0.26***  -0.22*** -0.23 -0.34  0.01 0.11***  -0.24***  -0.35*** 
RE_TA  -0.42 -0.42 -0.06  0  -0.36***  -0.36*** -0.53 -0.81  -0.1  0.28***  -0.43***  -0.71*** 
Z-score  -0.61 -0.34  2.23  -0.27  -2.84***  -2.57*** -0.56 -2.07  2.6 1.51***  -3.16***  -4.67*** 
N. Obs  388 130 518       473  41 514       
DURATION  34.1 48.62    -14.52***     11.71  33.2   -21.49***   
N. Obs  590 283         780 271         
 
 
Panel B. Before and after the law comparison by firm category 
 
  R  L   M  
Variables Before After  Difference Before  After Difference  Before After Difference 
LIA_A  0.9 0.96  -0.06**  0.92  1.27  -0.35*** 0.5  0.48    0.02 
TRADE_A  0.36 0.42  -0.06***  0.35  0.51 -0.16***  0.26  0.26   0 
DEBT_A  0.38 0.3    0.08***  0.36  0.33   0.03  0.14  0.11   0.03*** 
ROA1  -0.27 -0.23  -0.04**  -0.23  -0.34   0.11**  -0.01  0.01 -0.02* 
RE_TA  -0.42 -0.53    0.11***  -0.42  -0.81   0.39***  -0.06  -0.1   0.04** 
Z-score  -0.61 -0.56  -0.05  -0.34  -2.07   1.73***  2.23  2.6 -0.37** 
N. Obs  388  473    130  41   518  514  
DURATION  34.1 11.71  22.39***  48.62  33.2 15.42***      
N. Obs  590  780    283  271         35
Table 3: Duration of Reorganization 
 
 
The dependent variable is DURATION measured as the length of each bankruptcy procedure from the starting and the ending dates, 
calculated in months. AFTER is a dummy variable equal to 1 for firms filing after the new law and R is a dummy variable equal to 1 
for firms filing for reorganization. The rest of variables are defined in Table 1C. The model estimated is the Cox proportional hazard. 
Reported are hazard ratios and absolute values of z-statistics in brackets. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 
percent level.  
 





+ Industry  + SIZE  + Zscore  + SIZE & 
Zscore 
+ SIZE, Zscore, 
& Interaction 
terms 
AFTER  0.827 0.597 0.584 0.588 0.641 0.648 0.532 
  [0.77] [1.17] [1.22] [1.20] [1.00] [0.98] [1.25] 
R  3.083*** 3.163*** 3.167*** 3.090*** 3.218*** 3.143*** 2.748*** 
  [8.30] [4.94] [4.94] [4.83] [4.89] [4.78] [4.20] 
AFTER*R  14.535*** 18.069*** 18.871*** 19.196*** 17.138*** 17.419*** 24.632*** 
  [10.58]  [6.47] [6.56] [6.60] [6.31] [6.34] [6.27] 
Industry dummy  No No Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
         
Z-score      0.998  1 1.169 
      [ 0 . 0 9 ]   [0.02] [1.13] 
SIZE     0.991   0.986 0.983 
     [ 0 . 3 9 ]    [0.53] [0.67] 
AFTER*Z-score        0.768 
        [1.43] 
Z-score*R        0.744** 
        [2.10] 
AFTER*R*Z-score        1.602** 
        [2.50] 
N. Obs  1896 1193 1193 1174 1155 1138 1138 
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 Table 4: Selection into Reorganization 
 
The variables are defined in Table 1C and Table 3. B is a dummy that equals 1 for firms that filed any bankruptcy procedure 
(reorganization or liquidation). Absolute values of heteroskedasticity-adjusted (White) t-statistics are in brackets. ***, ** and * 
represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level.  
 




LIA_A TRADE_A  DEBT_A  ROA1  RE_TA  Zscore 
After  -0.005 0.008 -0.021**  0.006  -0.058**  0.323* 
  [0.24] [0.51]  [2.20] [0.61] [2.14] [1.90] 
B  0.418*** 0.090***  0.215*** -0.227***  -0.365***  -2.567*** 
  [8.89] [2.72]  [8.43] [9.13] [6.61] [9.69] 
After*B  0.353** 0.130**  0.008  -0.111*  -0.354**  -2.125*** 
  [2.37] [2.36]  [0.13] [1.87] [2.48] [3.62] 
B*R  -0.034 -0.004  0.025  -0.028  0.01  -0.246 
  [0.68] [0.11]  [0.90] [1.04] [0.17] [0.94] 
After*B*R  -0.246 -0.043  -0.056 0.129**  0.274*  1.772*** 
  [1.63] [0.74]  [0.88] [2.10] [1.89] [3.06] 
SIZE  -0.057***  -0.051*** 0.021*** 0.026*** 0.073*** 0.180*** 
  [6.68] [8.81]  [5.73] [6.59] [7.30] [3.50] 
AGE  -0.054***  -0.035***  -0.020***  0.003 -0.008 0.018 
  [4.33] [4.11]  [3.16] [0.45] [0.56] [0.25] 
Constant  1.393*** 1.009***  -0.103  -0.398***  -1.092*** -0.489 
  [8.10] [9.47]  [1.10] [5.20] [6.02] [0.46] 
N. Obs  1992 1992  1991 1934 1932 1974 
R-squared  0.28 0.16  0.24 0.28 0.19 0.3   37
Table 5: Recovery after Reorganization  
 
Panel A. Mean Difference of Zscore between bankrupt and active firms  
 
  B - 3yr  B - 2yr  B - 1yr  B year  B +1yr  B +2yr  B +3yr 
Before  -0.93 -1.41 -2.02 -2.57 -2.50 -2.65 -2.94 
No. of obs  38 72  100  99 85 61 58 
After  -1.34 -1.71 -2.17 -2.55 -2.31 -2.17 -1.42 
No. of obs  152 167 183 189 167 115  55 
 
 
Panel B. Regression analysis. 
 
Pretrend is a variable which takes values of -1,-2,-3 for years before the filing and Postrend is one which takes value of 1 in the year 
of filing, value of 2 in the first year after the filing and so on. Pretrend*AFTER and Postrend*AFTER are the interaction terms of 
Pretrend and Postrend with AFTER dummy. See Table 1 Panel C for definitions of other variables. 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6)
 difLIA_A  difTRADE_A  difDEBT_A  difROA1  difRE_TA  difZscore 
AFTER  -0.007 0.045* -0.066***  0.042* -0.047 -0.092 
  [0.17] [1.66] [2.78] [1.78] [0.86] [0.37] 
Pretrend  0.074*** 0.041*** 0.012  -0.068*** -0.092*** -0.536*** 
  [3.81] [3.01] [1.05] [6.26] [3.97] [4.47] 
Postrend  0.016 0.020***  -0.025***  0.029*** -0.096***  -0.04 
  [1.33] [2.67] [4.17] [4.59] [4.83] [0.53] 
Pretrend*AFTER  -0.018 -0.008 0.003  0.028** 0.014  0.155 
  [0.87] [0.55] [0.24] [2.40] [0.59] [1.20] 
Postrend*AFTER  0 -0.007  0.004  -0.005 0.022  0.230** 
  [0.01] [0.62] [0.42] [0.56] [0.82] [2.27] 
Constant  0.320*** 0.037*  0.244*** -0.257*** -0.302*** -2.522*** 
  [9.36] [1.68] [13.05]  [12.62] [6.43] [12.54] 
Observations  1975 1998 1945 1955 1962 1844 
R-squared  0.08 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.17 0.05 
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Variables are defined in Tables 3 and 4.  Trend is a linear trend, defined as 1 for year 1996, 2 for year 1997, etc. Crisis dummies are 
defined for two different crisis windows – year 1999 and years 1998-2000, as labeled in column headings. In Panel A dependent 
variable is DURATION estimated using Cox proportional hazard model. Model 1 reproduces Model 1 from Table 3. Reported are 
hazard ratios and absolute values of z-statistics in brackets. In Panel B dependent variable is Z-score. Model 1 reproduces Model 7 
from table 4. ***, ** and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level.  
 
Panel A: Duration of Reorganization 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Baseline  Trend  Crisis  1999  Crisis 1998-
2000  Crisis 1999  Crisis 1998-
2000 
AFTER  0.827 0.831 0.835 0.871 0.837 1.131 
  [0.77] [0.46] [0.69] [0.56] [0.30] [0.29] 
R  3.083*** 2.055**  2.704*** 3.877*** 2.154*  2.186** 
  [8.30] [2.02] [5.97] [6.11] [1.89] [2.05] 
AFTER*R  14.535*** 5.588***  16.632*** 13.811*** 3.658*  4.063*** 
  [10.58] [4.15]  [10.38] [10.23] [2.13]  [3.24] 
Trend   1.043    1.033  0.95 
   [0.37]    [0.21]  [0.40] 
Trend*R   1.272***    1.357*  1.393** 
   [2.12]    [1.93]  [2.53] 
Crisis    0.974  1.339  0.996  1.543* 
    [0.10]  [1.24]  [0.001]  [1.68] 
Crisis*R    1.514  0.711  0.57  0.619* 
    [1.45]  [1.41]  [1.44]  [1.81] 
N. Obs  1896 1896  1896  1896  1896  1896   39
Panel B. Z-score 
   (1)  (2)    (3) (4)   (5)  (6) 
 Baseline  Trend      Crisis 1999  Crisis 1998-2000    Crisis 1999  Crisis 1998-2000 
After  0.323*  0.688**    0.152 0.309*    0.323  0.675** 
  [1.90]  [2.38]    [0.83] [1.87]   [0.75]  [2.26] 
B  -2.567***  -2.843***    -2.684*** -2.664**    -2.895***  -2.835*** 
  [9.69]  [4.72]    [9.19] [7.45]   [4.54]  [4.77] 
After*B  -2.125***  -2.412**    -2.010*** -2.096***   -2.422***  -2.187** 
  [3.62]  [2.43]    [3.35] [3.62]   [2.03]  [2.18] 
B*R  -0.246  -0.113    -0.235 -0.207   0  -0.159 
  [0.94]  [0.19]    [0.81] [0.59]   [0.00]  [0.27] 
After*B*R  1.772***  1.885*    1.761*** 1.767***   2.205*  1.681* 
  [3.06]  [1.92]    [2.97] [3.09    [1.88]  [1.70] 
Size  0.180***  0.177***    0.177*** 0.180***   0.177***  0.176*** 
  [3.50]  [3.46]    [3.44] [3.50]   [3.44]  [3.45] 
Age  0.018  0.018    0.025 0.018   0.022  0.018 
  [0.25]  [0.25]    [0.33] [0.25]   [0.29]  [0.25] 
Trend    -0.116        -0.044  -0.114 
    [1.54]        [0.43]  [1.49] 
Trend*B    0.093        0.103  0.04 
    [0.43]        [0.40]  [0.17] 
Trend*B*R    -0.041        -0.112  0.012 
    [0.19]        [0.44]  [0.05] 
Crisis        -0.440** -0.055    -0.359  -0.036 
        [2.03] [0.34]   [1.20]  [0.22] 
Crisis*B        0.233 0.182   0.032  0.25 
        [0.35] [0.39]   [0.04]  [0.50] 
Crisis*B*R        0.058 -0.096    0.271  -0.188 
        [0.09] [0.21]   [0.34]  [0.38] 
Constant  -0.489  -0.09    -0.238 -0.454   -0.132  -0.07 
  [0.46]  [0.09]    [0.22] [0.42]   [0.12]  [0.07] 
N. Obs  1974  1974    1974 1974   1974  1974 
R-squared  0.3  0.3    0.32 0.3    0.3  0.3   40
 
 
Figure 1. Liquidation vs. Reorganization Decision Before and After the Law 
This figure plots the payoffs to liquidation (horizontal line at L) and reorganization (increasing lines) as a function of observed cash-
flow at date 1  1 x  when the firm is in distress,  p x < 1 . The left panel shows a high reorganization cost regime, while the right panel 
shows low reorganization costs. The payoffs to reorganization are given by  ] | ) ( [ 1 2 x x n E , ignoring subscripts, and therefore depend on 
reorganization costs. The top increasing line from 0  to  p x   and horizontal at  p  for  p x x > 1  represents the payoff to reorganization 
when expected reorganization costs are zero, while the bottom increasing line from 0  to  p   represents the payoff to reorganization 
when expected reorganization costs are maximal,  ) ( 2 x cB   in the left panel and  ) ( 2 x c A  in the right one. The top of each panel also 
reports the regions where the bank will decide to reorganize (R) or liquidate (L) the distressed firm. Before the law (left panel) there is 
no region where liquidation or reorganization alone dominates the other decision. Banks will restructure or liquidate depending on the 
expected reorganization costs. After the law (right panel), if observed cash-flow at date 1  1 x  is higher than 
* x  the bank will always 
decide to reorganize.   
 
  














 Before the Law                   After the Law
1 x
L
0 ) (  when  ] | [ 2 1 2 = x c x p E
p
p 0
) ( ) (  when  ] | [ 2 2 1 2 x c x c x p E B =
R or L
p x 1 x
L
0 ) (  when  ] | [ 2 1 2 = x c x p E
p
p 0
) ( ) (  when  ] | [ 2 2 1 2 x c x c x p E B =
R or L
p x 1 x
L




) ( ) (  when  ] | [ 2 2 1 2 x c x c x p E A =
R or L R
p x 1 x
L




) ( ) (  when  ] | [ 2 2 1 2 x c x c x p E A =
R or L R
p x  41







   42














B -3yr B -2yr B -1yr B B +1yr B +2yr B +3yr
Years before and after bankruptcy
D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
 
i
n
 
Z
s
c
o
r
e
Before
After